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ARTICLES
@POTUS: Rethinking Presidential
Immunity in the Time of Twitter
DOUGLAS B. MCKECHNIE*
President Donald Trump’s use of Twitter portends a
turning point in presidential communication. His Tweets animate his base and enrage his opponents. Tweets, however,
like any form of communication, can ruin reputations. In
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court determined that a
president retains absolute immunity for all actions that fall
within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties. This Article explores the “outer perimeter” of presidential immunity.
It suggests the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments inform the demarcation of the “outer perimeter,” and that
when a president engages in malicious defamation, his
speech falls outside this perimeter and is not protected by
presidential immunity.
The Article begins by examining Twitter as a social media platform and how it facilitates and affects the way we
communicate. It then focuses on how Presidents Barack
Obama and Donald Trump incorporated the use of Twitter
into their presidencies. I then explore four distinct lines of
jurisprudence that I argue inform how to identify the “outer
perimeter” of a president’s official duties: (1) presidential
immunity; (2) immunity for executive branch officials; (3)
*

Professor McKechnie is an Associate Professor in the Department of Law at the
United States Air Force Academy. He earned his J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and his B.A. from Ohio University. The views expressed
herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Air Force, the
Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
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the constitutional implications of defamation; and (4) the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition on government action motivated by animus. I posit that considering
these four doctrines, along with the method and manner of
communication facilitated by Twitter, malicious defamation
falls outside the “outer perimeter” of official presidential
duties, and thus, presidential immunity is inapplicable.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 2
I. TWITTER AND THE PRESIDENCY ......................................... 5
A. Twitter: A Window Into the Soul .................................. 5
B. Presidential Use of Twitter .......................................... 7
II. THE DISPARATE, RELEVANT DOCTRINES: ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY, DEFAMATION, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE
PROCESS........................................................................... 12
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B. Defamation and Immunity for Government Officials 16
C. The First Amendment Implications of Defamation .... 18
D. Government Action Motivated by Animus in Other
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1. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE’S PROHIBITION ON
GOVERNMENT ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS ... 21
2. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON
GOVERNMENT ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS ... 22
III. IDENTIFYING THE “OUTER PERIMETER”: ACTUAL MALICE
AND ANIMUS, TWO SIDES OF THE SAME CONSTITUTIONAL
COIN................................................................................. 24
CONCLUSION........................................................................... 33
INTRODUCTION
Never before has the President of the United States had access
to—and so routinely used—an immediate, unfiltered, and pervasive
media platform to communicate directly with the world.1 President

1

See Morning Edition: White House Communications Strategy Critiqued by
Former Obama Official, NPR (Feb. 13, 2017, 5:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/02/13/514935085/trump-administration-s-communication-strategy-critiqued-by-former-obama-official [hereinafter NPR’s Morning Edition].
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Donald Trump’s use of Twitter has broken the mold.2 Within this
new paradigm, a President can communicate his thoughts at any
time, on any subject, without the vetting process traditionally used
by, to one degree or another, other modern Presidents.3 While some
laud this as a positive hallmark, it also poses risks that the vetting
process can reduce or eliminate.4 With a President actively participating in the instantaneous communication social media allows, that
prophylactic process evaporates and a President’s message of the
moment is delivered in raw terms.5 Raw language, however, can
lead to liability.6
In the past, if a President was drafting remarks to be delivered
through traditional mediums and the remarks referred disparagingly
to a particular individual, defamatory language undoubtedly would
be stricken or wordsmithed so the message was delivered without
directly maligning the person’s reputation.7 However, as vetting
goes, so goes wordsmithing.8 In the age of Twitter, those disparaging words that would have otherwise ended up on the cutting room
floor may now find themselves contained within a 140-character
message9 delivered by, and directly attributable to, the President of
the United States.10 The individual who draws the ire of a President
may now find himself defamed, with reputational injuries resulting
from the President’s unadulterated words.11
2

Compare Philip Bump, You’re Not Really Following @BarackObama on
Twitter, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/04/youre-not-following-barackobama-twitter/316523/ (creating an Obama
Twitter account for the campaign staff to communicate with followers) with
Trump on Twitter: A History of the Man and His Medium, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38245530 [hereinafter Trump
on Twitter] (preferring to directly tweet about issues like foreign policy from his
personal twitter account in lieu of press conferences).
3
NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See infra Part II.
7
See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1.
8
See id.
9
“Tweet (n.): A Tweet may contain photos, videos, links and up to 140 characters of text.” The Twitter Glossary | Twitter Help Center, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/166337 (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) [hereinafter The
Twitter Glossary].
10
See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1.
11
See Trump on Twitter, supra note 2.
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While textually absent from the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has determined that a President retains absolute immunity when he
“acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official” duties.12 Therefore,
one would expect a defamation claim against a President to be met
with an absolute immunity defense.13 However, where a President’s
defamatory statements are motivated by malice, the absolute immunity defense is unavailable.14 The Supreme Court has determined
that in other constitutional contexts, such as the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, where the government is inspired by animus—malice’s equivalent—its activities fall outside the boundaries of constitutionally permissible government action.15 Those actions are void
as the Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in official actions for merely malicious reasons.16 If the Constitution proscribes maliciously motivated government actions,17 then maliciously motivated defamation likewise falls outside the “outer perimeter” of official acts constitutionally available to a President.18
As a result, malicious defamation cannot be included within the official duties of a President, and presidential immunity vanishes.
Furthermore, when the Constitution’s prohibitions on malicious
government actions19 are coupled with the First Amendment understanding of malicious defamation,20 the “outer perimeter” of presidential duties is clearer and a presidential immunity claim becomes
even more untenable.21 The United States Supreme Court has determined that in the interests of democracy and to ensure a robust and
open dialogue about public officials, the First Amendment protects
12

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
See id. at 755–56.
14
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (stating that when state
government actions are motived by “animus,” they are constitutionally impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment).
15
See id.; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693, 2695–96
(2013) (holding a statute invalid as the law served no legitimate purpose and was
used to ensure same-sex marriages “will be treated as second-class marriages”).
16
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
17
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
18
Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982) (concluding that the
President’s alleged wrongful act is “well within the outer perimeter of his authority” when it is made within his “constitutional and statutory authority”).
19
See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 at 631–32.
20
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
21
See id. at 282.
13
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a significant amount of speech that might otherwise constitute defamation.22 Yet, no matter how generous the latitude is under the First
Amendment, malicious defamation still falls outside the boundaries
of protected speech.23 Thus, the Constitution’s intolerance of government actions that are motivated by malice, taken together with its
placement of malicious defamation beyond First Amendment protection, evinces a constitutional preclusion of presidential immunity
where a President’s defamation is motivated by malice.24
This article has three parts. Part I explores the developing zone
where Twitter and the presidency of the United States converge. It
begins with an overview of how Twitter functions and how it encourages a hitherto unavailable form of communication with its own
distinctive method and style.25 It then chronicles how Presidents
Obama and Trump, the only Presidents to have used Twitter,26 have
incorporated it into their lives and the presidency. Part II explores
four distinct, but relevant, constitutional doctrines: (1) presidential
immunity, (2) immunity for executive branch officials, (3) the constitutional implications of defamation, and (4) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition on government action motivated
by animus. Part III argues that, when considering these four doctrines, it becomes clear that if a President engages in malicious defamation, then that speech is outside the constitutionally permissible
actions available to a President. Therefore, presidential immunity
would not be an available defense, especially in the time of Twitter.
I.

TWITTER AND THE PRESIDENCY

A.
Twitter: A Window Into the Soul
Twitter is a public, Internet-based platform that allows users to
post asynchronous messages, or tweets, that are 140 characters
long.27 Tweets require comparatively little time to draft and can be
posted by way of a mobile phone, computer, tablet, or virtually any
22

Id. at 269–70.
See id. 279–80.
24
See id. at 282.
25
See generally DHIRAJ MURTHY, TWITTER: SOCIAL COMMUNICATION IN
THE TWITTER AGE 1–3 (2013).
26
See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1.
27
MURTHY, supra note 25, at 1–2.
23

6

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

device connected to the Internet.28 Although tweets can be restricted
to a limited group of people with private access to a user’s account,
tweets are typically accessible by the general public, unlike posts on
social networking sites like Facebook.29 Tweets can refer to, and be
directed at, other Twitter users, thus allowing Twitter users to interact with each other regardless of a preexisting relationship or otherwise being acquainted.30 Though it is an available option, Twitter is
less a means by which to carry on bidirectional communication and
more a means to link the tweets of strangers so as to contribute to a
larger discussion.31
Twitter users are identified by their username preceded by the
@ symbol.32 A Twitter user’s tweet can reference any other user,
whether or not the users know each other, by simply adding the @
symbol as a prefix to a username.33 By using the # symbol, or
hashtag, in a tweet, tweets on a particular topic are aggregated.34 As
a result, if a user clicks on a word or phrase preceded by a # symbol,
he will see a list of tweets containing the same word or phrase.35 As
of August 12, 2017, Twitter had approximately 328,000,000 active
monthly users, and of those users, 80% of them accessed Twitter
through a mobile device.36
Unlike social networking sites that emphasize connecting with
and sustaining personal relationships, Twitter is a social media platform.37 It promotes the buildup of an audience, or followers, and
facilitates the airing of one’s thoughts to the audience in the form of
tweets.38 With limited space for posts, Twitter is considered a microblog most often used to capture and articulate one’s thoughts of
28

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 3.
31
Id. at 3–4.
32
The Twitter Glossary, supra note 9.
33
See id.
34
MURTHY, supra note 25, at 3.
35
The Twitter Glossary, supra note 9.
36
Salman Aslam, Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun
Facts, OMNICORE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/ (noting the percentage of Twitter users on a mobile device was last updated
on Jan. 24, 2017).
37
MURTHY, supra note 25, at 7–8.
38
Id. at 8.
29
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the moment or “quick reflections” as opposed to “coherent statements and discourse.”39 Twitter, like other microblogs, relies on its
members’ regular contributions.40 Indeed, it is this regularity and
repetition that can cause a loss of inhibition regarding what a user
reveals.41 It becomes second nature to retrieve one’s mobile device,
access Twitter, and “quasi-unconsciously” share intimate thoughts
and details with the world.42
These revelations, and other types of self-disclosure, are not the
only results of repetition. Sharing information about oneself on platforms like Twitter activates the same pleasure region of the brain as
food and sex.43 It is this biological reaction that creates a “reciprocal
cyclical feedback,” encouraging continued sharing of information.44
The impulsive, reckless self-disclosure fuels instant gratification
and can be repeated on demand.45 Additionally, reticence to share
otherwise private thoughts is eroded on Twitter because of the lack
of visual cues that humans usually rely on to discourage oversharing.46 This lack of visual cues also creates a disembodied aspect to
the communication and allows a user to more easily disassociate
himself from his actions, whether banal, malicious, or profound.47
B.
Presidential Use of Twitter
President Barack Obama’s personal Twitter account,
@BarackObama, was created by a campaign worker on March 5,
2007, two months before he announced his candidacy.48 His campaign continued to run the account from 2007 through the 2008 presidential campaign, into his first term as President, and throughout
his 2012 presidential campaign.49 While he occasionally signed
tweets from the @BarackObama account with his initials “-bo” to
39

Id. at 8–9.
See id. at 10–11.
41
Id. at 10.
42
Id. at 134–35.
43
See SUSAN GREENFIELD, MIND CHANGE: HOW DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES
ARE LEAVING THEIR MARK ON OUR BRAINS 103 (2015).
44
Id.
45
See id. at 103, 267.
46
See id. at 104.
47
See id. at 146.
48
Bump, supra note 2.
49
Id.
40
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indicate it was he who posted the tweet, his campaign staff was most
often responsible for the tweets.50 The tweets from the @BarackObama account dealt primarily with policy priorities and motivating
followers to support the President’s efforts.51 In January 2013, control of the @BarackObama account was transferred from the President’s campaign staff to Organizing for Action, a political non-profit
engaged in advocacy issues.52
In addition to his occasional personal tweets from @BarackObama, President Obama sometimes signed tweets from the official
White House account, @WhiteHouse.53 On May 18, 2015, President
Obama posted the first official presidential tweet from the presidential Twitter handle, @POTUS.54 When @POTUS was created, the
intent was that the Twitter handle would remain the official Twitter
account of the President of the United States, and the next President
would take over the account.55 On January 20, 2017, after the inauguration of President Donald Trump, former President Obama returned to @BarackObama and now tweets from that account.56
Unlike President Obama, President Trump had a significant
presence on Twitter as a private citizen before being elected President and taking control of the @POTUS account.57 Donald Trump
created his personal @realDonaldTrump account in May 2009,
seven years before being elected President.58 In the first few years,
Donald Trump shared responsibility for his @realDonaldTrump account with his staff; tweets he wrote himself included “from Donald

Id.; Roberta Rampton, Obama Gets His Own Account on Twitter: ‘It’s
Barack. Really!’, REUTERS (May 18, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-obama-twitter-idUSL1N0Y915O20150518.
51
Bump, supra note 2.
52
Id.
53
Rampton, supra note 50.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Brooke Seipel, Obama Returns to Personal Twitter: ‘Is This Thing Still
on?’, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2017, 4:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/inthe-know/315363-obama-returns-to-personal-twitter-is-this-thing-still-on.
57
See generally Trump on Twitter, supra note 2.
58
Id. Because the @DonaldTrump Twitter account had been created as a parody account, President Trump’s name is preceded by the word “real.” Id.
50

2017]

@POTUS: PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IN THE TIME OF TWITTER

9

Trump” in the message.59 Initially, his tweets pertained to his television show, his public appearances, and his family—not politics.60
In 2011, “from Donald Trump” stopped appearing in tweets
from the @realDonaldTrump account, which made it unclear
whether he or his staff drafted the tweets.61 At this same time, Donald Trump’s tweets became more political and more numerous.62
For example, in July 2011, with fewer than 2,000,000 followers,
Donald Trump tweeted about the relationship between China and
the United States.63 He suggested China was the United States’ enemy and was bent on destroying it.64 In May that same year, he made
his first reference to running for President.65 While he had only
tweeted around 275 times in the two-year period from May 2009 to
May 2011, in the last six months of 2011 he tweeted over 550
times.66 By 2016, Donald Trump was tweeting, on average, 375
times a month and had approximately 12,000,000 followers.67
On June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced his candidacy for
President of the United States.68 He continued to use his @realDonaldTrump account throughout the campaign to comment on a
variety of issues, including Macy’s department store’s decision to
discontinue selling his fashion line, presidential debate performances, and his political adversaries.69 Regarding his political adversaries, he referred to them as “weak,” “failed,” “nasty,” dumb,”
“wacko,” “light weight,” dopey,” and “crazy.”70 After his election,
59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.; David Lazer et al., I. You. Great. Trump.*, POLITICO (May/June 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/gallery/2016/04/donald-trump-twitter-account-history-social-media-campaign-000631?slide=0.
63
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 20, 2011, 1:10
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/93774719052029953; Trump on
Twitter, supra note 2.
64
Trump, supra note 63.
65
Lazer et al., supra note 62.
66
See Trump on Twitter, supra note 2.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Lazer et al., supra note 62; Andrew McGill, What Trump Tweets While
America Sleeps, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/10/what-trump-tweets-while-america-sleeps/503141.
70
Lazer et al., supra note 62.
60
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but before his inauguration, President-elect Trump continued to
tweet from his @realDonaldTrump account on a range of issues, including the media, his cabinet selections, and foreign and domestic
policy.71
President Trump assumed control of the @POTUS Twitter account on January 20, 2017, and now operates two Twitter accounts
simultaneously—@POTUS and @realDonaldTrump.72 As an indicator that he has personally drafted a tweet posted by the @POTUS
account, the initials “-DJT” are included with the tweet.73 Tweets
are posted from both of these accounts daily and, at times, within
hours or minutes of each other.74 For example, on February 6, 2017,
at 11:32 a.m., he tweeted the following from @realDonaldTrump:
“The failing @nytimes writes total fiction concerning me. They
have gotten it wrong for two years, and now are making up stories
& sources!”75 An hour later at 12:38 p.m., he tweeted the following
from @POTUS: “Will be interviewed on @oreillyfactor tonight at
8:00 P.M. Enjoy! –DJT . . . .”76
Since taking control of these two accounts, President Trump
tweets on a range of issues from both accounts.77 He has tweeted
about the media, his family, his choice for the Supreme Court, his
travel plans, his meetings with foreign heads of state, intelligence
leaks, his cabinet, his critics, and foreign and domestic policy.78 The
way in which President Trump communicates via Twitter ranges
from insulting to complimentary and from unabashed to measured.
It is his brash tweets, however, that have garnered the most attention.
For example, on January 26, 2017, he tweeted from @realDonaldTrump about the of release of Chelsea Manning from prison
and wrote: “Ungrateful TRAITOR Chelsea Manning, who should
never have been released from prison, is now calling President

71

Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President’s Tweets, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets (last updated Sept.
27, 2017, 3:11 PM).
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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Obama a weak leader. Terrible!”79 On February 4, 2017, in response
to a District Court judge’s decision to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order and stop the implementation of his Executive Order on immigration, he tweeted from @realDonaldTrump: “The opinion of this
so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from
our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!”80
Perhaps, however, his tweets about President Obama have
caused the most controversy. On March 4, 2017, at 6:35 a.m., President Trump, tweeting from his @realDonaldTrump account, wrote:
“Terrible! Just found out that Obama had my ‘wires tapped’ in
Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing found. This is McCarthyism!”81 At 6:49 a.m., he tweeted from the same account: “Is it
legal for a sitting President to be ‘wire tapping’ a race for President
prior to an election? Turned down by court earlier. A NEW
LOW!”82 Three minutes later, at 6:52 a.m., he wrote: “I’d bet a good
lawyer could make a great case out of the fact that President Obama
was tapping my phones in October, just prior to Election!”83 Ten
minutes later, at 7:02 a.m., he wrote: “How low has President
Obama gone to tapp [sic] my phones during the very sacred election
process. This is Nixon/Watergate. Bad (or sick) guy!” 84
Undoubtedly, it could be a crime if President Obama ordered an
intelligence agency to wiretap President Trump during the presidential campaign after having failed to obtain a warrant or order from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. However, if President
Obama did no such thing, then President Trump’s allegations that
President Obama criminally misused intelligence-gathering techniques could have a harmful effect on President Obama’s reputation.
While the story is still unfolding at the time of this writing, when
testifying before the House Intelligence Committee, the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated he had no information that supported the veracity of President Trump’s tweets.85
79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump’s Russia Ties, Comey
Confirms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/
politics/fbi-investigation-trump-russia-comey.html.
80
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II.
THE DISPARATE, RELEVANT DOCTRINES: ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY, DEFAMATION, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS
A.
Presidential Immunity
No exploration of presidential immunity would be complete
without a discussion of the first Supreme Court case considering the
issue—Nixon v. Fitzgerald.86 In Nixon, a U.S. Air Force civilian employee, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, appeared in front of a congressional
oversight committee to provide testimony regarding cost overruns
on a transport airplane.87 Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony reportedly provided embarrassing information about his supervisors and their ineptitude.88 Two years later, under a new presidential administration,
Mr. Fitzgerald’s position was eliminated as part “of a departmental
reorganization and reduction in force.”89 While President Richard
Nixon and his administration considered reassigning Mr. Fitzgerald
to a different federal agency, in the end, he failed to obtain another
position.90 Mr. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission and alleged his separation from federal employment constituted
retaliation for his congressional testimony.91
At the Commission’s hearing, the Secretary of the Air Force invoked executive privilege to avoid answering certain questions.92
Five days later, when asked at a news conference about Mr. Fitzgerald’s separation, President Nixon took full responsibility for the decision.93 The next day, the White House retracted the President’s
statement and suggested that President Nixon had confused Mr.
Fitzgerald with another employee.94 Ultimately, the Civil Service
Commission concluded that Mr. Fitzgerald’s termination had been
a result of his supervisor’s dissatisfaction with his performance and
not being a team player.95 Mr. Fitzgerald filed suit and, after some
procedural hurdles and discovery, included the President of the
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

457 U.S. 731 (1982).
Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738 n.16.
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United States as a defendant.96 The President claimed absolute immunity, which the District Court and Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected.97
As this was a case of first impression, the Supreme Court began
its analysis of President Nixon’s absolute immunity claim by surveying the jurisprudential landscape of immunity for government
officials.98 Nearly 100 years before President Nixon invoked presidential immunity, the Court considered the Postmaster General’s
claim of immunity from civil liability in Spalding v. Vilas and held
that “public policy and convenience” compelled recognition of immunity for suits arising from official acts.99 In Spalding, the Court
reasoned that failure to recognize such immunity would cause executive officials to be apprehensive in exercising their discretion for
fear of civil liability, particularly when time called for bold action.100
In other words, when acting in his capacity as a chief executive, and
within the limits of his authority, the head of a governmental agency
should not be in fear that the motivation behind his actions will be
the subject of a lawsuit.101
The Court continued a review of its case law by noting similar
reasons for recognizing absolute immunity for judges’ actions taken
in furtherance of their judicial responsibilities.102 The Court also
pointed out its previous recognition of a qualified “good faith” immunity for police officers and state executive officials for actions
taken in furtherance of their respective professional responsibilities.103 Nonetheless, the Court rejected the argument that, like

96

Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 740–41.
98
Id. at 744–45.
99
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). The Nixon Court noted that
its earliest recognition of immunity defense drew upon English common law’s
recognition of the defense. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744.
100
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744–45.
101
Id. at 745.
102
Id. at 745–46.
103
Id. at 746.
97
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judges, all federal executive officials possessed absolute immunity.104 Judges require absolute immunity “because of the special nature of their responsibilities.”105 However, the Court’s previous case
law had specifically left open the question of whether some federal
officials might be entitled to absolute immunity for public policy
reasons.106 The question for the Court, therefore, was whether the
President was the sort of federal official entitled to absolute immunity.107
The Court held that the President of the United States is indeed
entitled to absolute immunity for civil damages arising out of official acts.108 The Court reasoned that, when taking into account the
constitutional structure, separation of powers, and the nature of the
President’s office, the President is uniquely situated such that absolute immunity is required.109 The President’s Article II powers are
action-oriented—enforcing law, conducting foreign affairs, managing the executive branch—and thus, absolute immunity is a must
when the President is acting within his official capacity.110 Absolute
immunity frees the President and provides the maximum space to
operate without fear of liability.111 This is particularly so, as the
President often finds himself navigating issues where feelings run
high.112 The visibility of the office and the effects of presidential
actions on countless people necessitate absolute immunity because
the execution of presidential duties must be unencumbered from fear
of lawsuits.113
The Court placed some limitations, however slight, on this absolute immunity.114 Absolute immunity was not to be a magical incantation that would mechanically bar any lawsuit.115 Recognizing
104

Id. at 747.
Id. The Court added prosecutors to this list of government officials who
require absolute immunity. Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 748.
108
Id. at 749.
109
Id. at 748–49.
110
Id. at 749–50.
111
Id. at 751–52.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 753.
114
Id. at 756.
115
See id. at 753–54.
105
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that absolute immunity traditionally only extended to acts in furtherance of an official’s duties, the Court extended the President’s absolute immunity to those acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties.116 Undoubtedly, this was both an intentional and comparatively expansive grant of immunity; however, such immunity
was not without its limits. Actions falling outside of the “outer perimeter” of his official responsibilities would not retain the absolute
immunity shield.117 Ultimately, after applying this standard to the
allegations against President Nixon, the Court wasted no time in
holding that his actions regarding Mr. Fitzgerald’s employment fell
within his authority and were thus entitled to absolute immunity.118
Fifteen years later, the Court addressed a “temporary” presidential immunity claim by President William J. Clinton in a lawsuit over
allegedly tortious actions that took place before he became President.119 President Clinton argued that this temporary immunity prohibited civil litigation during the course of a President’s term and
extended to all but the most exceptional cases—even requiring temporary immunity for unofficial, pre-presidency acts.120 The Court
revisited its rationale from Nixon and the benefits of absolute presidential immunity.121
The Court reiterated its commitment to absolute presidential immunity for official acts because of the liberating effect it has on the
President.122 The public good is served, the Court restated, when a
President is free to take action in his official capacity without the
constant threat of liability for his decisions.123 However, because
“the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purposes,” immunity from unofficial actions
fails to serve that same public good.124 Thus, though the President’s
absolute immunity extends to the “outer perimeter of his authority,”
116

Id. at 755–56. The Court also discussed the political options available for
“punishing” a President; namely, impeachment and running for reelection. Id. at
757.
117
Id. at 756.
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Id. at 757.
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it does not extend to those acts unrelated to the particular functions
of his office.125
B.
Defamation and Immunity for Government Officials
The absolute immunity doctrine articulated in Nixon and Clinton
stemmed from claims for wrongful termination against President
Nixon while he was in office and for various torts that allegedly occurred before President Clinton was elected.126 Neither case considered a claim for defamation against a sitting President. Nevertheless,
the Court has spoken on the question of immunity for actions by
federal executive branch employees.127 Indeed, nearly twenty-five
years before the Court was first asked to consider the question of
presidential immunity, it explored similar immunity claims in the
context of alleged defamation by a government official.128
In Barr v. Matteo, former federal employees sued a government
agency and its director for defamation.129 The employees alleged
that the director, after being derided by Senators in the press, issued
a press release wrongly blaming them for implementing a policy that
resulted in mismanagement of government resources.130 Moreover,
the employees claimed the director had issued the allegedly untrue
press release with malice.131 The director claimed that, as a government official, he was entitled to absolute privilege or immunity,
which barred the employees’ malicious defamation claim.132
Recognizing that immunity for executive branch officials is a
judicial construct, unlike the Constitution’s specific immunity for
members of Congress, the Court set out to explore the boundaries of
a government official’s absolute immunity defense for a claim of

125
126

Id. at 694.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 739 (1982); Clinton, 520 U.S. at 685–

86.
127
Questions of immunity for executive branch employees are different from
immunity questions vis-à-vis members of Congress, as members of Congress are
covered by the Speech and Debate Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 564–65 (1959).
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131
Id. at 568.
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malicious defamation.133 Like in Nixon, the Court relied on the Postmaster General’s immunity claim in Spalding v. Vilas where the
Postmaster General allegedly disseminated maliciously false information to harm the business prospects of an attorney.134 The Court
quoted, with agreement, the Spalding Court’s rationale, which recognized an interest in protecting government officials from the trepidation that would imbue their official actions if their motives could
be the subject of a suit for liability.135 That trepidation, the Court
reasoned, would only tend to inhibit the official’s performance of
his duties and thus impede a well-functioning government.136
As noted in Nixon and Clinton, this immunity is not without limitations.137 It applies to only those acts that are within the scope of
the official’s duties.138 Although one might argue the aim of official
duties can only be to further the public good, thus barring immunity
if an official’s actions are not intended to do so, the Court suggested
the question is simpler than that.139 The question is only whether
“the occasion . . . would have justified the act, if [the official] had
been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it
was vested in him . . . .”140 As the government official’s position and
duties increase, so increases the privilege and the acts protected.141
Applying its reasoning to the employees’ defamation claim, the
Court held that, while it was a close call, the director’s press release
was within his duties and thus shielded by immunity. 142 As an acting
director, he had the discretion to use the means at his disposal to
respond publicly to accusations of mismanagement.143 It was of no
consequence that the director was not legally required to issue a
press release.144 Press releases are a standard practice often used by

133
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Id. at 569.
Id. at 570 (discussing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)).
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Id. at 572 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
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agency directors to communicate with the public to ensure a governmental agency functions effectively.145 What is more, the employees’ allegations of malice had no effect on the Court’s application of the privilege.146 Certainly, injuries may go without a remedy;
but, on balance, the public good is more effectively served by ensuring the government official is not constantly looking over his
shoulder.147 On this point, Chief Justice Warren disagreed.148
Chief Justice Warren posited in his dissent that the interests to
be balanced go beyond the singular wrong inflicted on the defamation victim.149 In addition to the public interest in limiting defamation claims so a government official feels uninhibited, there is a public interest in ensuring citizens feel free to criticize government officials without fear of “being subjected to unfair—and absolutely
privileged—retorts.”150 The absolute immunity provided to government officials in defamation cases will only serve to chill the speech
of those who would criticize them.151 Why rail against a public official if your criticism can be met with privileged defamation?152
Absolute immunity as applied to defamation claims protects the
powerful, silences the powerless, and limits open discussion.153 And
this, Chief Justice Warren argued, “is a much more serious danger
than the possibility that a government official” may be forced to litigate a claim for malicious defamation.154
C.
The First Amendment Implications of Defamation
While the absolute immunity doctrine ostensibly applies to any
presidential act that falls within the “outer perimeter” of presidential
responsibilities, some presidential acts necessarily implicate other
constitutional principles.155 For example, a President’s Article II
role as Commander-in-Chief is not a self-contained constitutional
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
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Id. at 575.
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Id. at 584 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1977).
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authority.156 A President’s Commander-in-Chief power is influenced by, and must be considered in light of, Congress’s Article I
authority to declare war.157 Similarly, communicating is not a selfcontained presidential act. A President’s power to speak is influenced by, and must be considered in light of, the First Amendment.158 In particular, defamatory speech occupies a unique position
within First Amendment jurisprudence, and that jurisprudence influences the realm of protected speech, including presidential
speech.159 Such jurisprudence shapes and illuminates the “outer perimeter” of presidential duties.160
Though recognized as a common law tort, and “never” considered protected speech,161 defamation took on a constitutional dimension in New York Times v. Sullivan.162 In Sullivan, a public official
sued a group of civil rights activists and the New York Times.163
The civil rights activists ran an advertisement in the New York
Times alleging an abusive and violent course of conduct directed at
civil rights activists by the police in Montgomery, Alabama.164 Sullivan, the plaintiff, alleged that the statements were untrue and that
the reference to “police” linked the untruths to him in his capacity
as a supervisor of the police department.165 He was successful in his
defamation claim in Alabama state court, but the decision was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court.166
The Court reasoned that Alabama state law governing defamation was constitutionally deficient in light of the First Amendment.167 Alabama state law permitted a finding of defamation if the
156
See Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the
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See Lincoln Caplan, How the First Amendment Applies to Trump’s Presidency, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency.
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words tended to injure the victim’s reputation and, where the victim
was a public official, an untrue statement permitted a presumption
of reputational harm.168 The Court found this burden on the public
official plaintiff insufficiently low when compared with the goals of
the First Amendment.169 The First Amendment, the Court reasoned,
evinces a deep, national commitment to a robust discussion of matters of public concern.170 This commitment recognizes and allows
for the possibility that untruths will seep into public discourse.171
However, that possibility does not erode the protection afforded by
the First Amendment for speech critical of public officials.172
The First Amendment, the Court decided, places a high burden
on a public official’s defamation lawsuit and proscribes unnecessarily strict burdens that might be placed on speakers.173 The First
Amendment compels a public official to prove the statements were
made with “actual malice” or “knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false . . . .”174 This high burden
on public officials assures wide latitude for the governed who are
critical of those who govern.175 Anything less could result in selfcensorship; those who might otherwise inveigh against public officials will steer clear of criticism that could contain even negligible
errors for fear that misstatements will open them to liability.176 This
would inhibit the “unfettered interchange of ideas” needed to bring
about “political and social changes desired by the people.”177
D.

Government Action Motivated by Animus in Other
Constitutional Contexts
The viability of absolute immunity in defense of a malicious defamation allegation against a President is not informed simply by
presidential immunity and defamation jurisprudence. Instead, it
168
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must also be considered in light of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s intolerance of maliciously motivated government actions.178 Indeed, the Supreme Court has opined on the
constitutionality of malicious governmental motivations and has
done so more recently than virtually all the cases discussed above.179
In particular, though using malice’s synonym, the Court has found
that government action motivated by animus violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution and are thus beyond the realm of constitutionally allowable government acts.180
1. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE’S PROHIBITION ON
GOVERNMENT ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS
In Romer v. Evans, the Court had occasion to consider whether
a Colorado state constitutional amendment could survive an Equal
Protection challenge where it was motivated by nothing more than
animus.181 In Romer, multiple Colorado municipalities enacted ordinances that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.182 In response to these ordinances, Colorado adopted a constitutional amendment prohibiting those and other antidiscrimination
laws that singled out gays, lesbians, or bisexuals for protection from
discrimination.183 The State posited that the constitutional amendment simply placed gays and lesbians in the same position as others,
providing no more and no less rights.184
The Court found that argument unpersuasive.185 Instead, the
Court interpreted the amendment as carving out only gays and lesbians from the larger population and prohibiting laws that would
otherwise protect them from discrimination.186 With the enactment
of the amendment, the state and its municipalities would be incapable of including gays and lesbians in any enumerated list of classes
of people specifically protected by antidiscrimination laws in either
178

See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996).
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180
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public accommodations or from government action.187 Indeed, even
adverse, arbitrary government action would go unchallenged if the
basis for the action was a person’s status as a homosexual.188 The
amendment, the Court found, did no more than single out and impose a unique disability on gays and lesbians.189
While laws routinely classify and benefit some classes of people
over others, to be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause
those laws must at least pass the minimum standard of scrutiny and
“bear[] a rational relation to some legitimate end.”190 In this, the
amendment failed.191 The Court reasoned gays and lesbians were
targeted as a class to make it more difficult for them to seek aid from
the government and protection from the law.192 Relatedly, the Court
determined this objective was motivated by nothing more than animus for gays and lesbians.193 Because government action motivated
by animus, or bare desire to harm, can never constitute a legitimate
government interest, Colorado’s amendment could not survive a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.194
2. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON GOVERNMENT
ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the federal government from enacting legislation motivated by animus.195 In United States v. Windsor, the Court considered whether
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was constitutional in light of
the Fifth Amendment.196 Because of moves by some states to permit
same-sex marriage, the federal government enacted DOMA, an

187
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amendment to the Dictionary Act, which redefined the word “marriage” for the purposes of the federal legislation to mean “a legal
union between one man and one woman.”197 When a widow did not
qualify for the federal estate tax’s marital exemption because her
deceased spouse was a woman, she filed suit challenging the constitutionality of DOMA.198 The Court concluded that DOMA’s purpose was to impose disabilities, and thus injury and indignity upon
a class of people, thereby violating the liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment.199
In reviewing the history of DOMA, the Court found the indignity that resulted from the law was not an unintended byproduct, but
“was its essence.”200 First, the mere fact that the federal government
was weighing in on a subject often left to the states increased the
unusual nature of DOMA.201 More importantly, Congress itself articulated the intent that the law would demonstrate and inflict a
moral rejection of state-sanctioned same-sex marriage.202 DOMA,
the Court determined, served no other purpose than to impose inequality, humiliate, and burden a class of people some states sought
to protect.203 While the Government argued it was acting within its
authority to articulate national policy, the Court noted that “[t]he
power the Constitution grants it also restrains.”204 In particular, the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
limits malevolent government aims.205 The Amendment demarcates
a border between constitutional, permissible government power and
extra-constitutional, impermissible government power.206 It then
197
Id. at 2683 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
198
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199
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200
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so long as those actions are “within the sphere of constitutional action . . . .” 304
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places the power to maliciously degrade and demean on the extraconstitutional, impermissible side of the border.207
IDENTIFYING THE “OUTER PERIMETER”: ACTUAL MALICE
AND ANIMUS, TWO SIDES OF THE SAME CONSTITUTIONAL COIN

III.

Before beginning a discussion of how the Court’s constitutional
understanding of maliciously motivated government action shapes
the presidential immunity doctrine, it seems necessary to establish,
in the first instance, that animus and malice are, at their core, related
concepts. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “malice” as a “desire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another . . .” while “animus”
is defined as “a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or malevolent
ill will . . . .”208 Black’s Law Dictionary states that “‘[m]alice,’ in its
common acceptation, means ill will towards some person.”209 Thesaurus.com lists “animosity” as a relevant synonym for “malice.”210
Whether one acts with “animus” or “malice” seems to connote the
same motivation: acting with contemptuous malevolence and hostility. As a result, the terms may be used interchangeably below because whether the animating intent behind government action is labeled “malice” or “animus” is a difference without a distinction.
The Constitution, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, draws a perimeter around the sovereign power of the state
and the federal governments.211 First, the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prohibits government from depriving a person’s liberty by demeaning them for no other reason than animus.212 At the
same time, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
similarly prohibits laws and government policies that have no legitimate purpose other than to classify a group of people and maliciously inflict injury upon them for no other reason than enmity.213
In exceeding these boundaries, government finds itself in a no man’s
207
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land. It is beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible action.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ boundaries, however, cannot be the only limitation on government action found in the Constitution. These “animus” boundaries—boundaries that create a perimeter demarcating legitimate from illegitimate state interests, demarcating constitutionally protected and unprotected action—must
exist elsewhere.
Malicious defamation constitutes a defamatory statement where
the speaker knows the statement to be untrue, or recklessly disregards its truth.214 If a statement harms a victim’s reputation and the
speaker knew the statement to be untrue, then the speaker must have
been motivated by ill will, or animus, toward the victim.215 This becomes no less true if the President is the speaker. Indeed, if a President maliciously defames, it does not simply stand alone as a defamatory statement.216 It takes on the imprimatur of state action.217 As
the head of state and in control of the executive power of the United
States government, the President is the highest-ranking political
leader. Thus, a President’s words are taken as an expression of the
government’s intentions, interests, and goals.218
Presidential immunity rests on the idea that the constitutional
orientation of a President’s responsibilities requires him to act, and
those actions should be as unencumbered as possible.219 Having to
continuously review one’s actions in light of potential liability, the
reasoning goes, will simply slow a President down and inhibit his
ability to perform his duties.220 So long as a President is acting
within the “outer perimeter” of those duties, absolute immunity
serves the public good.221 This rationale and policy is arguably convincing as it pertains to various situations in which a President may
find himself. For example, whether it be a mundane, managerial decision or a consequential, foreign policy decision, absolute immunity frees a President to effectuate the executive branch’s responsibilities. However, if a President maliciously defames, he transcends the
214
215
216
217
218
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220
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“outer perimeter” of his constitutional duties and finds himself beyond the legitimate functions of his office; he is in a no man’s
land.222 Like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments cabin government action by requiring, at the least, government action not be motivated by animus,223 the general thrust of the Constitution and the
First Amendment cabins the President’s official actions.
As absolute sovereignty in the United States resides in the people, and not the government, a President is in a position of limited
powers.224 He holds only the powers granted through the Constitution, and, as discussed in Nixon above, his absolute immunity flows
from his Article II powers.225 Unlike a single, king-like sovereign
that retains unfettered power and thus the inherent authority to act
without limitations, a President’s power cannot extend beyond the
power the people of the United States—the sovereign—have relinquished to their government.226 While the people have clearly articulated enumerated powers in Article II that further the legitimate
goals of a President’s constitutional role, a sovereign would not surrender the authority, and thus not grant a President absolute immunity, to engage in actions that are motivated by nothing but mere animus.
More specifically, a sovereign would not grant power to a limited agent to engage in injurious actions motivated by malice or animus. The exercise of this sort of power must be beyond the confines
implicit in the allocation of a President’s Article II powers. Thus, if
a President’s defamatory statements are motivated by malice, he
transcends the “outer perimeter” of his Article II power.227 He finds
himself in the same extra-constitutional no man’s land the government finds itself in under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment when
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its actions are motivated by nothing more than animus and enmity.228 Like the lack of constitutional authority to enact animus motivated laws in Romer and Windsor,229 a President’s maliciously defamatory speech would be illegitimate and thus, beyond the protection of absolute immunity.
The relationship between sovereign and President is not the only
source useful in identifying the “outer perimeter” of a President’s
absolute immunity as it relates to malicious defamation.230 The same
cabining of the President’s speech is also found in the First Amendment.231 In Sullivan, the Court considered the question of how the
First Amendment and defamation co-exist.232 In balancing the First
Amendment’s robust commitment to open debate of matters of public concern, and in particular of government officials, the Court announced the actual malice standard.233 Sullivan placed a constitutionally mandated high burden on public officials to succeed in a
defamation lawsuit.234 In doing so, the Court recognized that the debate on matters of public concern needs room for errors and misstatements.235 Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that while
good faith misstatements and misrepresentations inevitably occur in

228
A similar constitutionally mandated prohibition exists in the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process guarantees. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause limits the government’s ability to communicate information about its citizens. U.S. CONST. amend V. While the government owes no procedural due process for simply communicating information about someone, it may not communicate information injurious to one’s reputation unless the government first provides
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this realm, morally culpable speech uttered in bad faith is still subject to legal censure.236 Thus, malicious defamation of a public official, even in the face of the First Amendment’s commitments, may
be proscribed.237
While the Court in Barr held that maliciously motivated defamation does not, ipso facto, exceed the boundaries of absolute immunity, the Court’s decisions in Romer and Windsor, in light of Sullivan, command otherwise.238 As discussed above, Romer and Windsor invalidate government action when it is animated by nothing
more than malevolence.239 These sorts of government policies are
illegitimate in their genesis and beyond the boundaries that encompass constitutional policy options available to the government. To
be sure, these boundaries that demarcate permissible from impermissible government action under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are in no way narrow.240 At a minimum, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments simply require a government action be legitimate and rational—an exceedingly generous parameter of options.241
Likewise, Sullivan contemplates that however robust the First
Amendment’s protections may be, however exceedingly generous
the parameter of speech possibilities, maliciously motivated defamation also transcends the constitutionally available options of protected speech.242 Initially, of course, defamation was never thought
to be protected speech,243 and a question existed as to whether seditious libel was unprotected speech.244 Nonetheless, Sullivan extends
the protective boundaries of the First Amendment and brings some
defamatory untruths into its fold.245 But it stops short of bringing
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malicious defamation within the boundaries of speech protected by
the First Amendment.246
Thus, when taken together, Romer, Windsor, and Sullivan delineate one “outer perimeter” for presidential absolute immunity—malicious defamation.247 The boundaries of speech encompassed by
presidential absolute immunity are no doubt expansive, like the
boundaries laid out by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.248
However, when the President’s speech is defamatory and motivated
by nothing more than bad faith and malice, it is as equally illegitimate as the government action in Romer and Windsor;249 its genesis
dooms its absolute immunity protection from the start. Just as the
Sullivan Court stopped short of extending the First Amendment’s
protection to encompass malicious defamation,250 the absolute immunity provided to presidential speech must bump up against a
boundary that expects no more than the Constitution expects in other
circumstances: that government actions, whether legislative policy
or presidential speech, not be motivated simply by malice.
To be sure, it is of no concern whether a President speaks within
his capacity as President or in his personal capacity. While a President might speak on a matter traditionally within his purview, it is
no more entitled to absolute immunity if it is maliciously defamatory. In Romer, the amendment was brought about by a plebiscite:
the direct expression of the will of the people to govern themselves
and within the traditional power of a democratic system.251 In Romer
and Windsor, the laws would have regulated an area that is generally
and typically within the government’s usual legislative authority.252
246
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Nevertheless, these government actions, because they were motivated by animus, exceeded the constitutional periphery of government power established by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.253
Likewise, while a President may be speaking on a topic that is otherwise well within his official capacity, malicious defamatory
speech exceeds the outer perimeter of official actions—in this case,
speech—available to a President. At that point, a President leaves
behind the absolute immunity that shields his actions within the perimeter.
As the Court noted in Barr, Nixon, and Clinton, presidential absolute immunity is a judicial construct and necessarily requires a
balancing of interests.254 Specifically, with regard to defamation, the
Court in Barr suggested that those interests are, on the one hand, the
defamation victim obtaining redress, and, on the other hand, freeing
the government official to act.255 But, as Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in Barr notes, there is yet another interest of equal import: the
chilling nature of absolute immunity for malicious defamation.256 In
the context of malicious defamation and absolute immunity, the
First Amendment and Article II are in conflict.257 In that conflict,
the First Amendment seeks to give the widest possible latitude to
citizens to criticize a government official, including the President.
Article II, Nixon holds, necessitates a sphere of absolute immunity
within which a President can operate.258
The First Amendment’s protection, however, is not extended to
malicious defamation by a President.259 That speech is unprotected.
If a President’s malicious defamation is protected by absolute immunity, a situation arises where one party can sue for defamation
and one cannot. With the visibility of the office, “it will take a brave
person to criticize [the President] knowing that in reply [the President] may libel [his critic] with immunity . . . .”260 This becomes
even more chilling if a President has a penchant for litigiousness
253
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and, in particular, defamation lawsuits.261 Placing malicious defamation beyond the outer perimeter of legitimate presidential acts,
and thus beyond the protection of absolute immunity, safeguards the
First Amendment’s commitment to ensuring the freedom to criticize
our representatives, even the President.
The need for a distinction between absolutely immune defamation and defamation which falls outside the immunity sphere is only
more evident and essential in light of social media platforms like
Twitter. Twitter facilitates, if not encourages, unrestrained, visceral
expression.262 Human experience has always allowed for this sort of
communication, and the First Amendment undoubtedly and rightly
protects it; yet, human experience has also encouraged a tempering
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of the most destructive, harmful speech. Social cues, personal interaction, and time for reflection can serve as a moderating force. A
lack of these moderating forces, coupled with the inclination toward
uninhibited self-disclosure of otherwise private thoughts, as is found
on platforms like Twitter, facilitates a liberation of harmful speech.
This liberation in the hands of a President, if entitled to absolute
immunity, can only exacerbate the negative aspects of communicating via Twitter, including the harm it can cause.
Notably, when the Court considered the absolute immunity doctrine in Barr, the defendant’s allegedly defamatory speech was communicated in a press release.263 Press releases and similar mediums
for government speech provide the opportunity to contemplate, reflect on, and choose one’s words before communicating. To be sure,
communicating through a press release, or any official statement,
does not preclude the risk that defamation will occur. Moreover,
public officials are often called upon to engage in extemporaneous
speech, and this sort of communication can be valuable; it often provides a more nuanced understanding of their ideas. However, the
sort of unbridled spontaneous communication unleashed by Twitter
and similar social media platforms significantly increases the likelihood that government communication will contain harmful inaccuracies.264 These harms become more damaging in the hands of a
President because of both the prominence of his social media presence and effects of his words on numerous people.265
Excluding malicious defamation from the absolute immunity
sphere may certainly result in a President hesitating before turning
to social media to communicate with the public. However, viewing
absolute immunity for what it is—a judicial construct motivated by
public policy determinations—this hesitation will encourage and increase contemplative communication. Thoughtful, deliberate communication then decreases the prospect that a President will propagate communication motivated by nothing more than animus. Perhaps in 1959, when Barr was decided and press conferences were
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the platform of the day,266 the need for encouraging measured communication was less crucial. Nevertheless, with Twitter and instantaneous uninhibited communication becoming the norm, an interpretation of absolute immunity that results in reflection and avoiding
speech motivated by animus encourages a President to act within the
realm of constitutionally permissible government action.
CONCLUSION
Twitter and similar social media platforms have ushered in a
new way to communicate instantaneously, often in unadulterated
terms.267 Unadulterated speech, however, can be a breeding ground
for defamation. This is no less the case when Twitter is used as a
means for a President of the United States to communicate. While a
President’s immunity from liability is no doubt expansive, it is not
unlimited.268 Undoubtedly, a President is entitled to absolute immunity for acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties.269
However, if a President’s defamatory speech is motived by nothing
more than malice, he transcends that perimeter. When considering
the Constitution’s prohibition on government actions motivated by
animus,270 as well as the First Amendment’s exceedingly protective
boundaries that nevertheless stop short of protecting malicious defamation,271 it becomes clear that presidential immunity does not apply to malicious defamation claims. The Constitution neither tolerates nor protects government actions, including speech, when they
are motivated by #malice or #animus,272 even if tweeted by
@POTUS.
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